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Abstract 
 
The broad and dominant discipline of phenomenology has produced many studies of 
imagination. Phenomenological studies examine imagination as a dimension of language 
and explore the creative role of imagination in the creation of new meanings in language. 
This exploration has many implications in poetry where language is used creatively and 
new meanings emerge from the creative and unexpected use of language by the poet. This 
paper aims to describe a phenomenological account of imagination in poetry by 
introducing the concepts that appear most relevant to imagination in poetry within the 
domain of phenomenological studies. In order to do this, the study focuses on the main 
tenets of phenomenological studies relevant to imagination in poetry, namely the 
concepts of ‘metaphor’ and ‘intentionality’. The discussion highlights the level of 
creativity of imagination in poetry in comparison with the reduction of imagining to 
perceiving in language. Likewise, the poetic image in poetry is also introduced as an 
image which is not a resume of the old meanings of perception. Phenomenology of 
imagination in poetic creation takes us beyond the pervious analyses of the characteristics 
of imagination as a creative faculty and helps to establish a link between creativity, 
meaning and imagination. 
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A Phenomenological Overview of the Imagination  
Smith (2008) in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines ‘phenomenology’ as 
the study of phenomena; the “appearances of things, or things as they appear in our 
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experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our 
experience” (What is Phenomenology, para. 9). Phenomenology investigates the structure 
of various types of experience such as imagination, thought, memory, emotion, desire and 
perception. Casey (1967) states that phenomenological method in philosophy aims to 
make things that have been overlooked and taken for granted in human experience “more 
thematic” (p. 8). Many phenomenologists such as Husserl, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Merleau-
Ponty, Bachelard, and Ricoeur have discussed the concept of imagination and attempted 
to conceptualize its features. Before Ricoeur’s hermeneutic approach, the phenomenology 
of imagination focused on the role of “imagination as vision, as a special or modified way 
of seeing the world” (Kearney, 2004, p. 35). Imagination was thus defined in terms of its 
relation to perception using ‘description’ as a phenomenological method, such as in 
studies by Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. In the hermeneutic approach which was 
developed by Ricoeur, imagination is considered more in terms of language and less in 
terms of vision. Studying imagination in terms of language is what Ricoeur calls 
‘semantic innovation’. This means that “imagination is assessed as an indispensable agent 
in the creation of meaning in and through language” (Kearney, 2004, p. 35). Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic approach investigates the “linguistic functioning of imagination, that is 
exploring the creative role of imagination in language,” in any form such as symbols, 
myths, poems, narratives or ideologies. Ricoeur (1981) poses a question which embodies 
the hermeneutic turn in studying imagination in phenomenology: 
Are we not ready to recognize in the power of imagination, no longer 
the faculty of deriving ‘images’ from our sensory experience, but the 
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capacity for letting new worlds shape our understanding of ourselves? 
This power would not be conveyed by images, but by the emergent 
meanings of our language. Imagination would thus be treated as a 
dimension of language (p. 181). 
The move toward language ascribes imagination with different features. Imagining does 
not mean reproducing former perception of things, but rather it provides a situation anew 
where things are rephrased in such a way that “the situation is transformed or realized 
anew” (Murray, 1987, p. 203).  
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic exploration of imagination as a dimension of language and 
as a medium in creating new meanings have many implications in poetry, where language 
is used creatively and new meanings emerge from the creative and unexpected use of 
language by the poet. Ricoeur’s implementation of hermeneutics as “the art of 
deciphering indirect meanings” recognizes the creative power of imagination (1973, p. 
90). This paper aims to describe a phenomenological/hermeneutic account of imagination 
in poetry by introducing the concepts that appear most relevant to imagination in poetry 
within the domain of phenomenological studies. In order to do this, the study focuses on 
the main tenets of phenomenological studies relevant to imagination in poetry, namely 
the concepts of ‘metaphor’ and ‘intentionality’. The discussion highlights the level of 
creativity of imagination in poetry in comparison with the reduction of imagining to 
perceiving in language. Likewise, the poetic image in poetry will also be introduced as an 
image which is not a resume of the old meanings of perception. Hermeneutic 
phenomenology of imagination in poetic/artistic creation takes us beyond the pervious 
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analyses of the characteristics of imagination as a creative faculty and helps to establish a 
link between creativity, meaning and imagination.  
This paper is structured into two main sections. In the first section, imagination is 
discussed from the vantage point of the concept of ‘metaphor’. The second section moves 
on to examine and describe how the concept of ‘intentionality’ in phenomenological 
studies introduces imagination as an act of consciousness in creating new meanings in 
language and in poetry. 
 
Metaphor and Imagination 
In its zenith of conceptualizations in the Romantic period, creative imagination in poetry 
was associated with the emblematic language of nature (Zalipour, 2009). In the modern 
period, Ricoeur’s semantic innovation in the hermeneutic approach focuses on the 
creative role of imagination in relationship with meaning. Approaching imagination as a 
dimension of language highlights that the creative element in imagination is not located 
in images as was conceptualized by the previous studies of imagination, but in the 
emergent meanings in language (Ricoeur, 1981). To explain this phenomenon, 
imagination is studied by the phenomenologists from the perspective of the theory of 
metaphor. Metaphors are largely used in poetry and utilized by the poet/author to bring 
his/her literary imagery to life. Using the example of metaphor is appropriate as it 
epitomizes the way in which imagination contributes its creative role in making new 
meanings in language (literal level) and in poetry (poetic/literary level).  The following 
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discussion uses the metaphorical utterance as the unit of studying imagination in 
language and poetry. 
A good metaphor, as defined by Aristotle in the Poetics, is understanding and 
identification of similarities. The innovative power of imagination in language is defined 
by Ricoeur as the ability to establish similarity in dissimilarity. The example of metaphor 
in poetry epitomizes the way in “which imagination conjoins two semantic fields, making 
what is predicatively impertinent at a literal level into something predicatively pertinent 
at a new level” (Kearney, 2004, p. 49). In the following poem, Dream by Langston 
Hughes, we can see how the poet deviates from the established use of language and 
creates new meaning.  
 
Hold fast to dreams 
For if dreams die 
Life is a broken-winged bird 
That cannot fly. 
Hold fast to dreams 
For when dreams go 
Life is a barren field 
Frozen with snow 
– From Montage of  a Dream Deferred (1951) 
In the metaphor of ‘Life is a broken-winged bird’ Hughes deviates from the 
semantic use of ‘bird’ as a kind of natural creature. The poet’s imagination establishes 
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similarities or relations between ‘life’ and ‘a broken-winged bird’ in some way. 
Generally, in metaphor the first subject (life) is described in terms of the implicit or 
explicit attributes of the second subject (a broken-winged bird), which then enhances the 
description of the first (life). In metaphor-making process, “Imagination is the 
apperception, the sudden glimpse, of a new predicative pertinence, namely a way of 
constructing pertinence in impertinence” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 172-3). This means that the 
essential task of the metaphorical utterance and the resultant innovation lie in the 
production of a new semantic relevance by means of an irrelevant attribution. In the 
example above, ‘life’ and ‘bird’ are irrelevant at the literal level, while the poet’s 
imagination establishes them as relevant in a new semantic field. Therefore, life 
figuratively becomes a bird whose wings have been broken and it cannot fly. Being able 
to fly and having wings are the essential features of birds which are now attributed to life. 
This metaphor implies how life could fly when its wings have not been broken. In the 
context of the poem, this attribution and its meaning becomes clearer – that life can fly, 
referring to our success and happiness only when we have dreams, but when dreams are 
shattered the wings of life will be broken and flying is no longer possible. At the 
figurative level, the semantic field of life has joined or changed to another semantic field 
that is of the bird. The restructuring of semantic fields results in the extension of 
meaning. Imagination offers its specific role of mediation at this moment, that is, when a 
new meaning emerges from the remains of literal predication (Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004). 
The mediation of imagination is the moment of what Ricoeur calls ‘the shock of 
contradiction’, which is the cause of the dismantling of semantic fields. Kearney (1998) 
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refers to this as “semantic shock” in creation of meaning in metaphors (p. 4). In the 
coming together of the already-made perceptions and experiences, imagination mediates 
and abolishes the logical distance between the previous dissimilar semantic fields in order 
to produce the semantic shock, which, in its turn, creates the meaning of the metaphorical 
utterance.  
In poetry, the process of creation of new meanings through the medium of 
imagination is more innovative both in terms of conjoining semantic fields and 
production of semantic shock. The level of creativity of imagination involved in creation 
of meanings can be discussed by examining metaphors in poetry as in the above example 
and in language. In a commonplace metaphor like ‘life is a journey’, the first subject 
(life) is equal to the second subject (journey) in some familiar and comprehensible way. 
Here the joining of semantic fields occurs at the literal level; however, in some metaphors 
semantic fields move to the level of figurative language. It is especially the case for 
creative metaphors in poetry. In addition, the semantic shock resulting from the synthesis 
of dissimilar elements in poetry is more severe and intense. In this way semantic shock 
brings about the genesis of the new meaning. While words have multiple meanings 
through semantic innovation at the literal level, by placing words in relationship to one 
another in the context of a poem/literary text, imagination produces something new. 
Ricoeur (1975/1978) states that his attempt in hermeneutic phenomenology of 
imagination has been “to show how language could extend itself to its very limits forever 
discovering new resonances within itself. There is a linguistic imagination which 
generates and regenerates meaning through the living power of metaphorotcity” 
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(Kearney, 2004, p. 50). Figurative language and poetic metaphors in poetry are examples 
of the very limit of language extension where linguistic imagination appears more 
creative in poetry. 
On a different vein, metaphor has also been studied as an image in 
phenomenology of Bachelard with the purpose of characterizing the qualities of the 
poetic/literary image. In Bachelardian phenomenological studies, the poetic image is 
examined as being capable of giving birth to new meanings, rather than being a reservoir 
of old ones. Bachelard (1943) investigates and discusses creative imagination as a 
subjective power, the true source of psychic and poetic production. His idea on the notion 
of the link between metaphor and the image highlights the mediatory role of imagination 
in creation of new and fresh meanings in poetry. He focuses on differences between 
metaphor and poetic image where metaphor is studied as an image and is not as creative, 
innovative, poetical and dynamic as a poetic image. He believes that contrary to the 
poetic image, metaphor carries the old meanings of perception. According to Bachelard 
(1988), metaphors, like concepts, are used by thought and reason rather than by soul; 
therefore, metaphors have less value to poetry because they are intellectualized images. 
For Bachelard, metaphors are considered as false images which lack the directness of an 
image formed in reverie. Probably what Bachelard means by metaphor here is identifying 
similarities at the literal level. He makes a distinction between metaphor as a concrete 
perceptual image and a poetic image as an imagined image. Studying the distinction 
between these two reflects the phenomenological view of imagination in poetry where the 
literary/poetic imagination is different from act of imagining as perception. According to 
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Bachelard, a poetic image “destroys the lazy images of perception. Literary [poetic] 
imagination disimagines to better imagine” (1948/2003, p.  26).The term ‘disimagine’ 
refers to Bachelard’s notion of “metaphors of metaphors” (Bachelard, 1971/2005, p. xi). 
The former metaphor refers to already established and recurring familiar images in our 
mind and the world. The latter metaphor refers to the act of imagination giving new life 
and reality to the old metaphors, images of perception and their meanings. For Bachelard, 
images must, in some way, be reactivated by imagination which animates “the 
elementary correspondence between man and the world”. The imagination must instil “a 
second life into familiar images”; it must create “metaphors of metaphors” (Gaudine’s 
introduction in Bachelard, 1971/2005, p. xi).  
With reference to Bacerlard’s phenomenology of imagination, further distinctions 
between metaphor and poetic image can be made in order to characterize the quality of 
imagination in poetry as being able to create fresh and innovative images. For Bachelard, 
metaphor is real, whereas poetic image is unreal. This means that poetic image is not 
bound to conceptual reality. Poetic image is original because it comes before thought and 
it relates to the realm of archetypes (Hans, 1977). On the other hand, metaphor is 
intellectual and belongs to the realm of mind. Hans (1977) characterises Bachelard’s 
poetic image as “varioutional, reverberational, valuational and dynamic” (p. 317). The 
poetic image does not have a past. Metaphor is apprehended once for all while poetic 
image is new each time it is apprehended.  
      The discussion on the concept of metaphor and the creative power of imagination 
in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and Bachelard’s phenomenology indicates the existence of the 
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level and intensity in the innovative power of imagination in creating meanings in 
language and in poetry. The capability of language/metaphor/ poetic image to create new 
meanings as discussed above is the result of mediating role of imagination. Imagination 
plays a key role in establishing a new semantic relevance in irrelevant semantic fields. It 
synthesizes incongruent, dissimilar, opposites or impertinent elements and restructures 
new semantic fields. At the literal level, imagination puts together the already-
established, recurring and familiar images and creates meaning without transferring to a 
new semantic field. These processes make a “semantic shock” through which (new) 
meanings emerge out of the ruins of literal meanings. Semantic shock is the result of 
mediating role of imagination in abolishing the logical distance between separate 
semantic fields (Kearney, 1998, p. 4). Dynamic freshness of metaphor/poetic image 
depends on the extent and strength of semantic shock involved in creation of meaning. In 
the context of poem, since the poetic image is put in relationship with other images, 
semantic shock leads to more innovative and new meanings through the medium of 
imagination.  
 
Intentionality and Imagination 
Phenomenology basically studies how we experience ranging from perception, thought, 
memory, desire, and so on. Imagination certainly is one of the various types of human 
experience which phenomenology attempts to define and conceptualize. In this section, 
the focus is to show how the concept of ‘intentionality’ in phenomenological studies 
conceptualizes imagination as the medium of creating meanings in language. In addition, 
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the concept of ‘double intentionality’ will be used to explain the role imagination in 
creation of meanings in poetry. Intentionality refers to direct meanings of things. Double 
intentionality refers to indirect meanings that exist behind direct meanings as mostly seen 
in poetry. Before proceeding to discuss these issues, it is important to define 
‘intentionality’ and explain the relationship between intentionality and consciousness in 
phenomenological studies. In phenomenology,  
The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being 
directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. 
An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or 
meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling 
conditions (Smith, 2008, Phenomenology, para. 1). 
Intentionality is a particular characteristic of consciousness in phenomenological 
studies. It is “the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about 
something”; intentionality means ‘aboutness’, that every mental process has always a 
reference to a content or is directed upon an object or a phenomenon (Perus, 1997, para. 
2). This means that consciousness by itself does not exist. It exists because it always 
“intends”, “represents” or “is directed” towards a content or an object or a phenomenon 
(Smith, 2008, para. 5). In phenomenology, consciousness is known as “intentional 
consciousness” and its acts as intentional acts of consciousness. Imagination as an act of 
consciousness or a mode of consciousness was first articulated by Husserl (1970). He 
also defined the concept of image as “a thing in consciousness, a relation – an act of 
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consciousness directed to an object beyond consciousness” (Husserl, 1970, p. 14). The 
following helps to understand the relationship between intentionality and consciousness: 
Consciousness is defined by intentionality. It is consciousness of an object 
on the one hand and an inner awareness of itself on the other hand. Being 
confronted with an object, I am at once conscious of this object and aware 
of my being conscious of it. This awareness in no way means reflection: to 
know that I am dealing with the object which, for instance, I am just 
perceiving, I need not experience a second act bearing upon the perception 
and making it its object. In simply dealing with the object I am aware of 
this very dealing (Gurwitsch, 1940, p. 330). 
This means that every experience has a ‘primary object’, which is external and is 
not in consciousness, and the ‘secondary object’, which is internal and is the object in 
consciousness. Thus, the secondary object must include not only the consciousness of the 
primary object, but also the consciousness of this consciousness. For the very same 
reason every intentional consciousness of a primary object must in addition include itself 
as its own secondary object, every intentional consciousness of a secondary object must 
in addition include itself as its own tertiary object, and so forth (Gurwitsch, 1940). 
So far the relationship of intentionality and consciousness has been discussed. The 
attempt here is to define imagination as an intentional act of consciousness in creation of 
meaning first in language and then in poetry. Intentional act is when an act is directed 
towards an object under a certain aspect by its abstract content that is the meaning of that 
act. Image and imagination as intentional acts acquire their meanings in the process of 
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directedness or aboutness, that is, intentionality. Let’s consider a pen and an act of 
imagining a pen as an intentional act of consciousness. The image of a pen is constructed 
in our mind as the result of imagining, when we become conscious of both the object of 
pen and also the act of our being conscious of it. The mental representation of the pen 
shapes meaning of the pen. Meaning of the pen is different from the real object. The 
intentional act here is imagining or image-making. This means that we do not understand 
the pen,  feel the pen, believe the pen or have other experiences with the pen. Otherwise, 
the meaning of pen would be changed in terms of different experiences. Our experience is 
to imagine a pen. Hence the resultant meaning of a pen is specific to this intentional act 
of imagining. The explanation given above is an example of creating direct meaning from 
the perspective of the theory of intentionality. Images derive their specific aboutness from 
the specific aboutness of the ideas, beliefs, and intentions of their creators – the poets, for 
instance, in the case of images in poetry. 
In imagining experience as an intentional act of consciousness, when objects are 
not present or when we imagine things that do not refer to any real objects in the world, 
the above discussion centers on the idea of double intentionality. This is mostly the case 
of images in poetry. How do their meanings shape? How are indirect meanings of images 
formed behind their direct meanings? What follows investigates the answers to these 
questions. 
We are conscious of absent or non-existent things in the same way as for real 
objects according to the theory of intentionality (Siewert, 2006). The argument 
concentrates on the way meanings are created through the act of imagining. The example 
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symbol will be explained with regard to meanings of non-existent objects, absent objects 
or images with indirect meanings such as in poetry. Symbols illustrate how the 
intentional act of imagining of an image (referring to a symbol) results in meanings that 
embody layers of indirect meanings. The focus of discussion is that “A symbol is a 
double intentionality”. This means that “one meaning is transgressed or transcended by 
another”, which is the work of imagination (Kearney, 1998, p. 154).  
Cosmic symbols are categorized as the most basic level of symbols because they 
include “both a thing and a sign”. Cosmic symbols refer to “aspects of the world – the 
heavens, the sun, the moon, the waters – as signs of some ultimate meaning” (Kearney, 
1998, p. 151). This means that the real object is present in the world like in the case of a 
pen but it also has another referent. We become conscious of “water” as a thing, for 
instance, when our consciousness intends towards it through the intentional act of 
imagining. As a result, its literal meaning is formed, that is to say, water referring to its 
real colourless liquid. In addition, consciousness intends towards water as “sign” whose 
referent is not present. It is through the double intentional act of imagining that we 
become conscious of its significance as a symbol. As a result, its symbolic meaning is 
created, for example water as referring to renewed spiritual life. 
The intentional act of imagining becomes more creative in other categories of 
symbols – for instance dream images and poetic images. Dream images are images of the 
collective and individual unconscious. Dream exemplifies “how we can say things other 
than what we are ostensibly saying; how behind direct meanings there are indirect ones. 
Because of this double intentionality, symbols are what make ‘poets of every dreamer’ ” 
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(Ricoeur in Kearney 1998, p.154). Symbol in poetry reveals “the welling-up of 
language”, or as Ricoeur believes it is “language in a state of emergence” (Kearney, 
1998, p. 154). Symbol in poetry carries the highest level of creativity in the imagining 
act. It is important to note that symbol may not be created if it could not be imagined, 
referring to imagining as an intentional experience. In other words, its meanings is 
formed or created through the intentional act of imagining. 
  The conceptualization of imagination in the phenomenological studies using the 
concept of “intentionality” illustrates the role of imagination in creation of meanings in 
poetry which is made through a double intentionality. The double intentionality of 
imagination in poetry characterizes this concept with a sense of communicability which it 
creates in the context of the poem (Zalipour, 2010 forthcoming). As discussed earlier, 
intentionality means directedness or aboutness. In the case of the poetic image, there is a 
double intentionality. According to the theory of intentionality, when consciousness is 
directed toward an object, that is to say, when we become conscious of an object, an 
image is made. This image has its specific and direct meaning with regard to its 
maker/creator and experience of the imagining act. When this image (with its direct 
meaning) is put in the context of the poem by the poet, it is directed toward another 
image in the poem, and in such a context the image acquires another meaning (moving to 
a new semantic field) through the second act of intentionality. Poetic images are capable 
of being directed at other images in the context of poem. In other words, they can 
communicate with other images through the double intentional act of imagining, which 
leads to the creation of new meanings. In the poem, Place (1988) by Merwin, for 
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instance, the communicability of images through the double intentionality of imagination 
enhances the meaning of the central image of the poem to a symbolic one.  
On the last day of the world 
I would want to plant a tree 
 
what for  
not for the fruit 
 
the tree that bears the fruit  
is not the one was planted 
 
I want the tree that stands 
in the earth for the first time 
 
with the sun already 
going down 
 
and the water 
touching its roots 
 
in the earth full of the dead 
and the clouds passing 
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one by one 
over its leaves 
 
— Merwin, The Rain in the Trees (1988) 
In Place, Merwin manifests the poet’s personal desire on the last day of the world. 
The persona of the poem desires to plant a tree that does not bear “the fruit”. The central 
image of the poem is a tree which is impregnated with new dimensions of meaning in the 
course of the image-making process within the context of the poem. The central image – 
a tree – does not possess the characteristics of a natural tree in the literal level: a woody 
perennial plant that grows to a height of several feet and typically has a single erect main 
stem with side branches, and roots in soil.  A symbolic image of a tree grows line by line 
and image by image in this poem, and the image of tree acquires emblematic nuances at 
the end of the poem. Place is initiated with a conceptual image of time and place: “On the 
last day of the world/ I would want to plant a tree” (lines 1-2).  There are many sensory 
images in his poem that are closely related to the image of tree such as water, roots, 
clouds, earth, sun and fruit, the sunset, planting a tree, and bearing of the fruit. The 
central image of them poem, tree, becomes communicable to other images. In Place, all 
images are powerfully link to the central image so that they help the image of tree grows 
to a symbolic one. This becomes possible through a strong sense of intentionality. This 
means that the image of tree acquires its symbolic meaning in the process of aboutness as 
it is directed to other images in the second act of intentionality. The tree’s specific 
aboutness is fed by the poet’s intentions to create the symbolic image of the tree. The 
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image of the tree as an intentional act is about a real tree, but within the certain imaginary 
and the context of the poem it acquires its new meaning. In other words, the image of tree 
does not refer to the object of tree in real life. Communicability of the central image of 
the poem, close association of the images in terms of their meaning as well as the 
condensed imagery of the poem help the creation of symbolic meaning of the tree that 
can only be planted in the last day of the world. 
 
Conclusion 
The link between imagination and language has been addressed by the phenomenological 
thinkers. The crucial role that imagination plays in the creation of meaning as discussed 
in Ricoeur’s ‘semantic innovation’ makes it  evident that images can no longer be 
adequately understood in terms of their immediate appearance to consciousness and 
imagination is no longer the power of images to represent absent objects (Kearney, 2004). 
This paper examined phenomenological /hermeneutic treatment of imagination with the 
focus on imagination in poetry. The discussion introduced the potential properties of 
imagination in language and poetry in order to highlight the mediatory role of 
imagination in creating new meanings.  The exploration of the role of imagination as a 
medium of creating new meanings in language by phenomenologists, takes the concept of 
imagination further in its developmental conceptualizations as a creative faculty of 
images. A more innovative and creative power of imagination in poetry is gleaned by 
comparing the examinations of metaphorical utterances in language and in poetry.  The 
explanation also highlighted the level of creativity of imagination and poetic/literary 
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image in poetry in comparison with the reduction of imagining to perceiving. The study 
showed phenomenological explanation of imagination as a medium of creating new 
meanings which is more intense and innovative in poetry compared with language. The 
characteristics of poetic image also demonstrated that imagination is not restricted to the 
realm of perception and sensation. Creative imagination is a reverie in which poetic 
image is formed.  
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